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The chief danger of such price fixing is the damage to the consumer. Such
a law might give rise to an abuse of such agreements by manufacturers and
dealers ending in collusion and resulting in arbitrary price fixing. It is not
necessary to pass new legislation when adequate laws are already in effect. The
Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department are authorized to police
the legislation originally passed in regard to fair trade regulations.
The writers are in agreement with the Federal Trade Commission and
President Roosevelt who stated at the time of the passage of the Miller-Tydings
Amendment, that there was no need for such legislation, since there were
already laws present on the statute books.
The reason for the law has largely disappeared because of changing economic
conditions. Faced with possibility of inflation such a law is restraint on a free
and competitive market. It is in the interest of the public that there be a return




Precedent has shown that fate of a legislative act in many cases may well be
decided by initially affording a presumption of validity or invalidity to that act
when it is tested before a judicial body. While the decisions which have taken
formal cognizance of this factor are numerically few, the evolution of the tenuous
concept has been a moving force in the philosophy of American Constitutional
law. Its application for the most part has been confined to that class of cases
involving the reasonableness of the legislative act in question.' This is par-
ticularly true when complaining citizens believe the questioned statute imposes
encroachments upon their fundamental freedom.2 It is in these instances that
the court must weigh the interests involved and ultimately uphold or strike down
the legislative act. Manifestly, the initial presumption and the weight it is given
may determine the result reached.
It would, therefore, seem most appropriate at this time with the Roosevelt
appointed court in its-descendancy, to review the three schools of thought on the
subject, emphasizing the two antithetical approaches as to constitutionality of
1 E. g. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 423 (1926) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).2 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 (1931); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938).
all legislation and unconstitutionality of legislative acts which invade areas of
political liberty 8 or place purported rational restrictions on racial equality.
4
At the outset from the failure of the Court to concern itself with the applica-
tion of presumptions in the majority of decisions, it may be assumed that there
is a school of thought which advocates that no presumption attaches to a statute
as to validity or invalidity. This view finds basis in the rationale implicit in the
statements of the Court, which prescribe a duty upon the Court to protect rights
secured by the Supreme Law of the Land against impairment or destruction by
legislation,5 and its response by testing the statute entirely on the basis of the case
as it stands on its merits. An example of this type of reasoning where the Court
considered the constitutionality of a statute devoid of any extraneous factors is
found in The Employers' Liability Cases.6 There the Court stated:
. . . in testing the constitutionality of the act, we must confine ourselves
to the power to pass it and may not consider evils which it is supposed will
arise from the execution of the laws whether they be real or imaginary. 7
The possible theory underlying such an approach to judicial review of statutory
enactments is that some justices while not desiring to favor a real presumption
of validity, and not wanting to go to the other extreme of presuming invalidity
feel that the doctrine of separation of powers will be best preserved by adherence
to this view. This is clearly an analytical approach, and in its limited sense is
not without merit.
The second school of thought on the subject advocates a genuine presumption
of validity of legislative acts and requires a pronounced forbearance on the part
of the judiciary in exercising its power of review unless the act clearly invades an
area of freedom which is constitutionally protected from impingement. The
outstanding proponents for this judicial restraint as the doctrine is more popularly
known, have been Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The basic
tenet which has been responsible for the adoption of this view is that the legis-
lative and not the judicial branch of the government is the most competent and
qualified to establish regulations and restrictions which are to control the social
compact. In short, if any reasonable doubt exists as to the validity of the statute,
that doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality. The funda-
3 Political liberty in its broadest sense, comprehends both property rights and rights
of substantive due process. Here is especially meant the liberties guaranteed under the
First Amendment. Representative of this approach is the opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) at pages 539-540.
4 "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unjust hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to their rights the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the Constitution." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-374 (1886); Ah Kow v.
Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552 (1879).
5 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238,
296 (1936).
6 207 U. S. 463 (1908).
Ibid. p. 492.
mental assumption is that the statute was enacted by the legislature after a careful
discernment of the problem to be corrected, and that their judgment was exer-
cised in a both sagacious and constitutionally sound manner.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in the second Flag Salute
case 8 vehemently attacked the majority for failing to utilize restraint. In his
desire to admonish those who overruled a previous Supreme Court holding on
the same question 9 he unequivocally reiterated the principle which he would
follow:
. . . the comprehensive judicial duty of this court in our constitutional
scheme whenever legislation is sought to be nullified on any ground, namely,
that responsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they
are directly to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is
to determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in the
legislatures they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable justification
can be offered.
During the late 1930's and throughout the majority of the 40's a recrudes-
cence of the Bill of Rights resulted in a similar revitalization of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 10 As a consequence of this liberal interpretation, and the newly
found freedom derived therefrom, a completely new approach to the subject of
presumptions and their relation to a statute's constitutionality was synthesized.
The staunchest advocates of judicial protection for these preferred rights of the
individual were the late Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Justices Black and
Douglas, though not quite as zealous in their belief, agreed in substance with
the premises of the late Justices. Their theory, as one author has suggested,"
was a different appreciation of the "Constitutional Philosophy" of Mr. Justice
Holmes. In effect the view has been taken that the "clear and present danger"
doctrine, and the general attitude toward civil liberties implicit in it, requires
that the ordinary presumption of validity be reversed when statutes affecting
these liberties are before the court.' 2 The opposite view represented by the second
school as expounded today by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, admits of no such sub-
division and maintains the protection of civil liberties resides with the legislature
and utimately with the people. This Holmesian view attempts to be completely
objective in an effort to attain maximum justice.' 2
8 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 646, 649 (1943).
9 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
10E. g. Herndon v. Lowry, 310 U. S. 242 (1937); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501
(1946) ; Tucher v. State of Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946).
11 Barnett, Mr. justice Mu'phy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 Corn.
L. Q. 177 (1946).
12 This theory would also find justification in the canon of statutory construction which
would require a rigid interpretation of any statute which is penal in that it involves im-
pairment of life, liberty, or property. This doctrine apparently would have greater signi-
ficance in England, however, where constitutional restrictions on impairment of liberty are
not enumerated. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev.
383, 386 (1908) ; See also Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes,
48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 756-68 (1935).
Is Frankfurter, Mr. justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938).
Regardless of which of the aforementioned conclusions is accepted, it is
nevertheless, inescapable that the root of this new theory lies in the "clear and
present danger" test as first authored by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Schenck case.
14
He reaffirmed his view in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York 15 six years later,
wherein the majority opinion announced the "bad tendency test". In 1927, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed in a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Holmes joined, his faith in the original doctrine.
. . . no danger flowing from speech can be clear and present, unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion . . .Only an emergency can justify
repression. 16
The "dangerous or bad tendency" doctrine remained as the accepted stand-
ard. however, until 1937 when the Fourteenth Amendment was given broader
construction. A this time while the "clear and present danger" rule was not
readopted, a serious encroachment was made upon the old test. The net result
was that a more or less neutral position was reached with no presumption at all
being allowed. In DeJonge v. Oregon,17 the Court struck down the Oregon
Criminal Syndicalism Act and held that mere membership in the Communist
Party or attendance at one of its meetings was not an abuse of the rights of free
speech and assembly. The legislature's right to proscribe abuses of rights was
here recognized, but the rights themselves could not be curtailed. That same
year, the Court in overruling a conviction of a Negro Communist under the
Georgia Sedition Law held that "the power of the state to abridge freedom of
speech and assembly is the exception rather than the rule." 18 The Court flatly
rejected the "dangerous tendency" test which characterized the Gitlow 19 decision.
Mr. Justice Roberts in speaking for the majority showed that the Holmes view
was now acceptable in his reference to the exercise of the state power to curb
free speech and assembly.
[lIt must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of dangers to
organized government. The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered.
The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to
the safety of the state.
Though this decision does not unequivocally reverse the usual presumption of
validity with respect to acts of the state legislatures, it does demand of the court
a more exacting scrutiny of the "appropriate relationto the safety of the state." 20
The following year Mr. Justice Stone made apparent for the first time the
Court's solicitude for this rising jurisprudential theory in his controversial 21
14 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 49 (1919).
15268 U. S. 652 (1925).
10 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).
17299 U. S. 353 (1937).
1 8
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258 (1937).
19 See note 15 supra.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 See Frankfurter concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 89 (1949).
yet celebrated note 4 to the Carolene Products Company case.2 2 While the usual
presumption of validity was sustained in connection with the question of an
economic regulation, his opinion pointed out that he considered "liberty of mind"
cases as being an exception to the general rule.
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of consti-
tutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
23
With this note as the cornerstone of their authority Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr.
Justice Rutledge with the intermittent support of Justices Black and Douglas,
plunged headlong into their development of a reverse presumption of invalidity
in the field of statutory infringement of civil liberties.
The first indication of the shift in the judicial application of this new
doctrine was given in Schneider v. State.24 The Court said:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights of
freedom of speech and of press is asserted, the courts should be astute to
examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercises of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions. And so as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the
courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulations of the free enjoyment of the
rights.
2 5
Thus the state was placed in the position of having to prove the reasonableness
and necessity of the means selected. This burden of proof was again placed
upon the state authorities when Mr. Justice Murphy in Thornhill V . Alabama 20
cited the Carolene note 27 and declared that the courts must "weigh the circum-
stances" and "appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced" in testing a
regulation which would abridge a fundamental freedom.
The net effect was a reestablishment of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine as the test to be applied in this class of case. In Bridges v. California 28
the Court briefly summarizes and evaluates the concept and its new application.
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
29
The approval of the Court of this statement of the doctrine was manifested in
Pennekamp v. Florida 30 and again in Board of Education v. Barnette 31 where
22 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
23 Ibid.
24 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
2
5 Ibid, p. 161.
20 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
27 See note 22 supra.
28 314 U. S. 252 (1942).
2 9 Ibid, p. 263.
80 328 U. S. 321, 334 (1946).
31 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
Mr. Justice Jackson clearly distinguished the degrees of protection which must
be afforded to the basic freedoms as opposed to other substantive rights. While
the preferred freedoms may only be restricted in the event of some grave and
immediate danger to public interest, other legislation may be upheld on a mere
showing of a "rational basis" for it.82
By this time the stage had been made ready for an innovation in the law.
The buried footnote in the Carolene Products 33 case had indicated that the theory
of presumed constitutionality was not invincible. Prior to the revolution, how-
ever, the First Flag Salute case 34 was decided. It presented a stumbling block in
the path of the onrushing tide which had to be swept aside. There Mr. Justice
Frankfurter supported by the entire court with the exception of Chief Justice
Stone promulgated the "reasonable basis" rule. This regression proved to be
ephemeral, and in 1941 the disintegration of the previously heavily corroborated
doctrine began. The first break came in the Milk Wagon Driver's case85 when
justices Black and Douglas broke from the majority and declared the right t-
picket even in a "context of violence" was a constitutionally protected freedom
of expression which could not be proscribed on the ground that the State had a
"reasonable basis" for doing so. In 1942, after religious tracts hawkers had
refused to pay a new discriminatory peddler's tax,8 6 Justices Stone, Douglas, and
Murphy in the minority opinion 87 claimed exemption on grounds of religious
freedom and announced their abandonment of their previous position in the
First Flag case.38 Shortly thereafter, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,89 Justice Rut-
ledge joined forces and the former minority became the majority. In that case
vendors of religious literature were given tax immunity for the privilege of dis-
tributing their pamphlets. Though the tax was to be equally imposed on all
asking permission, the Court held that freedom of religion and freedom of
press was available to all, not only to those who could pay their way. 40 A few
weeks later the belief that refusal to salute the flag was a guaranteed liberty was
vindicated.x4 A genuine foundation had been set making it possible for the doc-
trine to attain full reality in what is now Mr. Justice Rutledge's most noted
opinion. 42 In striking down a regulation which made it necessary to obtain an
organizer's card before being permitted to solicit membership for unions, the
stamp of established doctrine was placed on the principle that the guaranties of
82 Ibid, p. 639.
33 See note 22 supra.
34 See note 9 supra.
85 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 299
(1941).
388 ones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 600 (1942).
87 Ibid. pp. 623-624.
88 See note 9 supra.
39 319 U. S. 105 (1943).
4 0 Ibid. p. 111.
41 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
42 Rockwell, justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 Yale L. Q. 27, 45 (1950).
the First Amendment occupy a preferred position in our constitutional scheme.
As was stated by Mr. Justice Rutledge:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this court to
say where the individual's freedom ends and the state's power begins. Choice
on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given
in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms by the
First Amendment-that priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusion
43
The rationale of this decision is that the "clear and present danger" doctrine
would be limited to only the "gravest abuses endangering paramount interests". 4 4
Contiary to the strict analytical approach, this criterion demands an active and
critcial judicial review by the court, although in the first instance the determina-
tion of the line of restraint on free expression rests with the legislature.
The Court's recalcitrant position in refusing to permit limitations on this
fundamental liberty was more firmly engendered when that liberty was regarded
as being protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is exemplified by a number
of Jehovah's Witnesses cases which referred specifically to the "preferred posi-
tion" which this liberty held in American philosophy.
45
The reverse presumption reached its highest peak in United States v. C.I.O.46
in the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in which justices Murphy, Douglas
and Black joined. In unequivocal terms the opinion stated:
• . . that judgment does not bear the same weight and is not entitled to the
same presumption of validity, when the legislation . . . restricts the rights of
conscience, expression, and assembly protected by the Amendment, as are given
to other regulations having no such tendency. The presumption rather is
against the legislative intrusion into these domains.
47
A slight descendancy in this exalted position was noted in the concurring opinion
of Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper.48 His argument is based on the
proposition that Mr. Justice Jackson did not in fact subscribe to the extreme
application of the view in Thomas v. Collins,49 and therefore the doctrine was
never fully accepted by a majority of the Court. But when Justice Reed joined
48Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529-530 (1945).
44Ibid. p. 531.
4 The phrase was apparently first used in the dissent of Chief Justice Stone to Jones
v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 600, 608 (1942). It reappears in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105, 115 (1943); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944); Follett
v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 575 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946);
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 562 (1948).
46 335 U. S. 106 (1948).
47 Ibid. p. 140.
48 336 U. S. 77, 89 (1949) See also Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S.
586 (1940) and Frankfurter's dissent to West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624, 646 (1943).
40 323 U. S. 516 (1944); Jackson subsequently confirmed this in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 180 (1949) ; cf. Cushman, Civil Liberties in Ten Years of the Supreme
Court: 1937-1947, 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 32, 42, 43 (1948); Mosher, Mr. Justice Rutledge's
Philosophy of Civil Rights, 24 N. Y. L. Q. Rev. 661, 667 (1949).
the solid minority of Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas and Black in a case which up-
held the right to speak under circumstances which admittedly pressed the guaranty
to its periphery50 the reverse presumption once again was revitalized.
Since that momentous decision, however, the deaths of Justices and Murphy
have greatly affected the application of the reverse presumption. With Justices
Black and Douglas as the only ardent supporters remaining, the doctrine has
fallen into disuse. At best their minority is only likely to enlist the aid of other
Justices in particular instances, and the likelihood of persuading three others to
join at one time seems highly improbable. An indication of the present trend is
shown in the Dennis case 51 when the previously liberal position which the Court
had taken in the Terminiello 52 case was modified by acceptance of Circuit Judge
Hand's rule of "clear and probable danger."
A third ramification of the liberal view of the Court is discernible in those
cases which involve statutes which make distinctions as to race. Because race
distinctions are odious to a free people, such statutes while not presumed uncon-
stitutional, are immediately viewed with suspicion, and only pressing public
necessity can justify their enactment. The constitutional prohibition applicable
to such statutes may be found in the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 53 In reviewing the statute which would make distinctions the
Court first determines whether or not a reasonable basis exists for the classifica-
tion made,5 4 and then whether or not it has reasonable relation or is reasonably
adopted to the end sought. 55
5o Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
51Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), affirming 183 F. 2d 201, 212 (2nd
Cir. 1950), "In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the "evil" discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
52 See note 50 supra.
5 U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
54 The rules by which the equal protection contention must be tested have siated as
follows: "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise
of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is with-
out any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law-is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must
carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon an reasonable basis, but is essen-
tially arbitrary."-Van Devanter, J., in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61, 78-79 (1911).
55 "In passing upon legislation assailed under the equality clause we have declared
that the classification must rest upon a difference which is real, as distinguished from one
which is seeming, specious, or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated
alike, that the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of a purpose or the
promotion of a policy, which is within the permissible functions of the state and must
bear a delation to the object of the legislation which is substantial, as distinguished from
one which is speculative, remote, or negligible."-Brandeis, J., in Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 406 (1928), where he dissented on the merits.
In cases involving personal rights, such as the right to work,"" and the
right to a jury chosen without discrimination as to race, 57 the Supreme Court has
given little if any weight to the usual presumption of validity. An extension is
noticeable in Hirabayshi v. United States.58 The Court presumed racial equality
was part of American tradition and stated that:
because racial discriminations are in circumstances irrelevant, and there-
fore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war,
Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national
defense ...59
The inference to be drawn from the language of the Court is that except for the
fact that an emergency existed, the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
military order in question would have been upon its proponents.
Shortly thereafter the Court in more conclusive terms with Mr. Justice
Black announcing the majority opinion, cast real doubt on the validity of racial
statutes.6 0 He stated:
... it should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is to
Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an-
tagonism never can . . . 61
Thus the Court made it quite clear that in cases where the civil rights of a
racial group are curtailed, it would not only completely refuse to apply the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, but would in fact, require the party who invoked
the support of the statute to show its operation was reasonable and justified by
pressing public necessity. In a more or less circuitous manner the Court's "rigid
scrutiny" had given rise to a presumption of invalidity, no matter how slight.
CONCLUSION
Three basic views as to statutes and their presumed validity have been pro-
mulgated. The first school of thought with its silence as to presumptions evalu-
ates the statute from a purely analytical viewpoint. It considers the statute in
question with no regard for normative factors. Such a formula makes for
mechanical jurisprudence. It is a stereotyped approach which operates in a sphere
wholly devoid of any ethical standard which may serve as a guide in judgment.
Thus interpreted the law is neither dynamic or all pervading in its approach to
the myriad of problems it must govern in future application.
The last two schools of thought with their opposing views, have been ex-
plained by Professor Chaffee as different facets of the Holmes Tradition or
Philosophy of Law. 61
56 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33 (1915).
57 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947).
58 320 U. S. 81 (1943).
59 Ibid. p. 100.
60Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).
61 Ibid. p. 216.
The school which advocates that a real presumption of validity attaches to
every legislative act is based on the Holmes theory that the legislature is the only
competent body to regulate society and its relations. It must be necessarily pre-
sumed that the legislature has obeyed all constitutional commands and prohibi-
tions. To recognize these enactments as mandatory they must be placed above
the slightest suspicion.
The second facet holds that, often, Justices who advocate broad govern-
mental control over business are usually the same men who want to invalidate
any wide legislative control over discussion. Justices who fall into such a category
know that legislation to be sound, fair and effective must be preceded by full
discussion, both oral and printed. Statutes which would limit discussion would
necessarily limit the legislative function because they are similar to rigid consti-
tutional limitations on lawmaking. Thus a critical judicial spirit which gives
the legislature a wide scope in limiting property rights will also tend to allow
speakers and writers wide scope in arguing against such legislative invasion of
these rights. Thus, while Holmes advocated judicial restraint so as not to abro-
gate the legislative function, he indicated in the Lochner 63 and Abrams 64 cases
that liberty of discussion belongs side by side with legislative liberty.
Professor Carl B. Swisher reconciles this conflict on the basis that a self
governed democracy should not be permitted to deprive itself of its own power
of self government by indirection, namely self expression and education. 65 In
other words no tenable principles of political liberty will permit a political body
to decree its own self execution.
No matter which interpretation of the theory is accepted, in its entirety
the philosophy of the view is subject to a twofold criticism. First, it fails to
accord the proper authority to the doctrine of judicial supremacy which in turn
deprives the individual of the court's protection, except in those cases where the
arbitrary character of the statute palpably requires the court to break the bonds
of its own restraint. Second, the over-emphasis on the government and its social
policies is based on a material and transient standard in apparent disregard for
the paramount position which the individual should occupy. Hence, the mere
presence of a statute demands that it be presumed sanctioned.
This premise is basically sound, but it does not operate in all cases. In the
realm of the metaphysical there is a fundamental difference between property
rights and rights of personality. Rights of personality may also be further
ramified into those which are accorded a sacred position because they are
62 Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States (1941), p. 360-61.
63 Lochner- v. State of New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) ; See Holmes dissenting at
page 74.
64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
65 Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in United States (1946), p. 161.
synonymous with the concept of liberty in its fundamental sense. The basic
difference (i.e. between rights of property and rights of person) is rudimentary
in jurisprudence. The second distinction (i.e. among personal rights as related
to the concept of liberty) though self evident, finds recognition in the Bill of
Rights. 66 In its entirety the Constitution embodies a comprehensive system of
checks and balances and of separation and delegation of powers, which is care-
fully calculated to afford a maximum protection to human freedom. It represents
a self imposed obligation to uphold basic liberty and requires infringements
thereof to be subject to the most rigid scrutiny. The resulting presumption is
that the desired infringement is without legal justification, for that liberty is
inviolate in all but the exceptional case.67
It is submitted that if true vitality is to be given to the prohibitive nature
of the First Amendment the freedoms it protects will more likely be accorded
their proper recognition. While it is realized that limitation on individual free-
dom may at times seem extremely desirable from a social standpoint, nevertheless
in the long run a liberal attitude in vindication of due process of law will best
serve the ultimate needs of freedom.
JOHN J. C. O'SHEA
WILLIAM F. SONDERICKER.
66 E. g., The First Amendment embodies fundamental liberty which is by its nature
more precious than trial by jury or protection from double jeopardy.
67 Freedom of thought and belief are absolute, but when manifested in acts inimical to
public welfare such acts may be proscribed. Compare: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296 (1940) ; Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, note 41 with Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S.
333 (1890).
